1 Thanks to the kind efforts of Sara Shneiderman, an early version of this text was presented at a cosponsored talk for the Center for India and South Asia Research and the Department of Anthropology at the University of British Columbia (UBC) in January of 2016. The author expresses gratitude for the thoughtful comments of the audience members at the UBC event, for the helpful suggestions of the blind reviewers of South Asia, and for the expert feedback of the special issue editors Patrik Oskarsson and Siddharth Sareen. Additional thanks go to Kama Maclean and Vivien Seyler for help in producing this text, and the special volume of which it is a part. 'Survival of the fittest, or in other words, 'might is right', describes India's current approach to dam building. The less fit-the poor, the Adivasis [tribals], the politically and economically weak-are being forced to pay the price of development. And the power of the fittest-the rich, the elite, the state machinery-is being used to extract this price, as has been the case in previous decades. We have learnt nothing.' Have We Learned', the special issue is representative of many debates that took place over previous decades, as well as in subsequent years. The submissions chronicle various cases of hydropolitics in South Asia as well as a number of people's movements against large dams that span the Himalayan regions of Bhutan, India, and Nepal. Numerous contributors lament that past calls for public participation in development planning, for rigorous cost-benefit analyses, and for post-clearance environmental monitoring have gone unheeded. Sripad Dharmadhikary, quoted in the above insert, points out that the price for these projects has often been paid by the people displaced, and the communities downstream, as well as by the natural environment. Offering scathing commentary, Dharmadhikary further contends:
Even as evidence mounts against large dams, New Delhi is un-inclined to respond meaningfully. Perhaps this reluctance stems from the fact that part of the answer would be to stop building many of the proposed large dams, not to mention relinquishing some of its decision-making power to affected people, and claiming less direct control over the country's resources. As such, no real answers have been offered, and the authorities have instead chosen to bypass or ride roughshod over those who protest or propose alternatives. 3 It is precisely because the marginalisation of dam opponents and activists is well established in existing hydropower debates that I begin with critical commentary on the politics of dam building. While there have been select periods of decline in the construction of hydroelectric projects in India, 4 corporations and governmental offices continue to insist on building dams for reasons of flood control; for water supply transfers for agriculture, commerce and household use; and for electricity. 5 When scholars point out the opposition to those projects, however, their narratives sometimes frame the politics of dam building in ways that pit the 'powerful' against the 'powerless'. 6 Such discourses paint images of likeminded 'communities' who ostensibly agree on the ills of particular projects, but who are nonetheless forced to accommodate them when government bodies insist that they must be built. 7 Without undermining the value of dam critiques, or of the positive potential of people's movements, 8 this article seeks to infuse the discourses that circulate about the politics of hydroelectric development with additional perspectives in order to move beyond the powerful-versus-powerless trope of dam conflict. 9 These additional perspectives help us understand why there is also complicity with the wider project of dam building, and that this complicity can exist among those that view such projects unfavourably.
More specifically, the text examines the comments of Indian citizens who chose not to protest against a series of dams that were set for implementation along the highest tributary of the River Ganga (also known as the Ganges) in the country's northwest mountain region of 
Resource Conflict Through the Prism of Cultural Politics
Cultural politics is a pertinent framework for the following discussion because it includes the processes enacted when sets of social actors shaped by, and embodying, different cultural meanings and practices come into conflict with one another. 13 In a cultural politics formulation, 'culture' is a 'site of contestation' that includes social inequities and relations of power as well as ideas of 'identity, community, and territory'. 14 When applied to the study of resource conflicts, a cultural politics lens involves looking at contending discourses, resource values, and visions of an improved social and ecological world. In looking at the realms of action and critique associated with cultural politics, existing scholarship suggests that civil Developments, it was particularly the repeated reminder that India was not-yet developed that had an effect on how Indians saw themselves. He argues: '...to be a national subject in an 'underdevelopment country'-for example, to be a citizen of India-is to occupy an overdetermined subject position interpellated by discourses of the nation and [original emphasis] the discourses of development to which that nation is subjected.' 21 To state it otherwise, the discourses used to promote and validate dams in India operate as powerful factors shaping the cultural politics of hydroelectric dam building.
Movement Tensions and Subtexts of Social Discord
When I first began visiting Garhwal in 2004 to make inquiries about the impact of dam building on the region, the government's emphasis on development was a concern that several interlocutors initially flagged when explaining that 'that there is no use' in opposing hydroelectric projects already decided upon by the state. Over subsequent years, interlocutors gave further commentary that ranged from, 'There is no point in resisting,' to, 'You can't fight the government.' Numerous examples of highly contentious development projects from the past were given as evidence of this; disputed dams on the religiously revered Narmada and Ganga rivers, for instance, had ultimately gone ahead despite decades of social movement protest. This produced skepticism that politicians would have their way regardless of the efforts that citizens might enact to oppose particular projects.
Suggestions that social movement campaigns were (and are) pointless can be a great source of consternation to those that take the time and energy to contest hydroelectric Loharinag Pala, and Pala Maneri-were meant to direct water out of the Bhagirathi, a main tributary of the River Ganga that flows from a protected glacial source at Gaumukh.
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Activists involved in a series of occasionally overlapping social movement campaigns (some of which were organised by mountain residents, others of which were organised by plainsbased residents visiting the mountains for short visits) were motivated in part by the ecological impacts that these medium sized diversion dams threatened to cause due to the drilling and blasting of the tunnels needed to create an underground slope severe enough to generate electricity. 2324 Many of the activists who joined in the ebb and flow of dam opposition campaigns also cited their concerns about the cultural and religious implications of building dams on the last unobstructed and freely flowing stretch of the Ganga-an entity revered by Hindus as a source of spiritual purification and a symbol of Hindu faith. Since the construction of these projects entailed extensive dynamite blasting and drilling in order to build the tunnels designed to redirect water out of the river's main flow, river devotees worried that the very essence and divine power (shakti) of the Goddess Ganga would be diminished because only freely-flowing (aviral) water is considered holy and pure (nirmal).
The relative proximity of these dams to the Ganga's glacial source and to a downstream temple town and pilgrimage destination at Gangotri was further invoked to frame the opposition as an appeal to protect the cultural and religious sentiments of selfidentified Hindus. A spot near the Gangotri temple is where the Goddess Ganga (who embodies the River Ganga and imbues it with her divine grace) is believed to have fallen from heaven. These histories solidify the temple as a major pilgrimage destination for devotees seeking to gain the Ganga's divine blessings. 22 When mentioning this tributary, residents call it the 'Ganga' rather than the 'Bhagirathi'. 23 Once electricity is produced and put into the power grid, the water is released back into the riverbed (as opposed to it being used for irrigation or to augment the water supply). 24 Displacement was not a primary concern as the land and residence loss of diversion dams is nominal compared to the impact of reservoir dams.
Because the dams were set for implementation just a few dozen kilometres downstream from Gangotri, opponents asserted that the government-approved projects were an insult to the Goddess embodied by the waters, and a move that showed insensitivity to the reverence that Hindus hold for the river. A main reason for this assertion was that, once completed, the tunnels attached to the diversion dams would force the Ganga out of its riverbed for long stretches and away from the loving gaze and touch of devotees. 25 At a regional level, this would hamper the ability of Hindus to access the culturally and religiously important waters needed to sanctify ritual acts. At a national level, some worried that the damming of the last freely-flowing stretches of the Ganga would serve as a final act of disrespect to a river that is extensively manipulated and heavily polluted.
In response to range of cultural, religious, and ecological concerns evoked by the three dam projects, some of the residents of Garhwal banded together to raise awareness.
Many others-many millions of others-did not. This caused a point of confusion, and reflection. Why wasn't there a mass movement to stop the final three dams on the last freely flowing section of what is arguably India's most iconic river? When I tried to pose this question to dam opponents who gathered for a rally that was not well attended (see Figure 1 below), one interlocutor replied sharply, 'Because they are hypocrites.' When asked for clarification, she explained her opinion that any self-labeled Hindu who does not rise to defend the Ganga against desecration is hypocritical; the mandates of their faith should compel them to action. Another interlocutor explained away the lack of civil society action to stop dams on the Ganga by saying that Indian citizens have become 'too passive' and 'too 25 The intense desire of devotees to be by the Ganga's side is made especially public when millions gather in one of the world's best organized mass events during the auspicious period known materialistic' to take the action needed to protect the river. Others reflected that Indians have become 'too secular', and thus less inclined to stand up for the sacred river's defense. dams were set for construction claimed that it was many of the activists who were, in fact, 'hypocritical'. Many of these interlocutors minced no words in saying that they looked upon the social movement campaigners with suspicion. In the crosshairs of such critiques were the lead activists, the ones in the limelight. These leaders were described by numerous interlocutors as motivated by a pursuit of their own brand recognition and notoriety.
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'Fame-Seeking Activists' and Leadership Critiques
Within the movements, it became evident over time that as people went about the work of identifying the most effective way to 'frame' the issues and opposition campaigns, 27 they were also trying to ascertain who was in the fight to defend the Ganga for the 'right' (or unselfish) reasons and who, by contrast, was involved for the purpose of ego gratification and perhaps personal gain. The research uncovered a persistent concern that some people were involved in the effort to stop dams on the Ganga in order to promote their own 'name and fame'. The wording meant to indicate that certain people desired to increase their own notoriety and prestige by serving as visible movement leaders. This accusation, often posed 26 The less prominent citizens who joined the rallies and marches were forgiven by such critics for being followers compelled by their love (prem) for the River Ganga and its Goddess. in English even among Hindi speakers, carried significant weight. It was a very serious charge, as was the assertion that certain people took part in the campaigns to 'enlarge one's own name' (apna naam badaane ke liyee). Over time, the name and fame trope became an important point of investigation not just because of the internal divisions it revealed, but also because of the resource politics that it had the potential to illuminate.
A chance exchange was particularly revealing of the distrust that some people treatment, then the argument was to double one's personal efforts to selflessly serve the divine entity within those waters while remaining above the political fray. These comments were especially interesting because this couple had previously expressed dismay at the river's treatment and the scope of the development activities that had, in their eyes, lead the river to ruin. 28 They wanted to see the river looking healthy and running free, and they worried about the region's future prospects if the Ganga was further impaired.
In his response to the couple's statements, I expected that the renunciant would object and say that it was precisely because of the river's importance to Hindus that they have a religious duty to protect the Ganga from dams, regardless of the wider politics. Instead, he offered slowly spoken commentary that supported the criticisms of my two interlocutors.
'The general public', he began, 'is of the opinion that these [people and] organizations working in the name of Ganga... they think that they just want money, (and) that is why they protest.' He then immediately drew upon a past movement legacy, the fight against a downstream project known as the Tehri dam. The leader of that movement-Sunderlal
Bahuguna-was named as someone whose primary aim was notoriety and financial gain. The renunciant contended that this man, a person that I will introduce later while defending his track record, was the first to protest against the Tehri dam and that he was also the first man to take rewards from the government on the condition that he would stop protesting. 'When his money would run out', claimed the renunciant, 'he would go back and sit down on strike.
When he got money again, he would keep quiet. So that is how it goes. There are many such examples.' The husband and wife agreed, lamenting that such people could not be trusted.
Nodding as he stood to purchase his medicine, the renunciant emphasised that the problem is that movement leaders 'do not have the support of the general public.'
These comments were not isolated to this one exchange. During the main period of fieldwork from 2008-2009, I encountered numerous conversations that echoed the sentiments expressed. Some of my interlocutors even encouraged me to disregard the movement leaders I was speaking with and ethnographically shadowing, as they were 'only politicians' using the call to save the Ganga to advance personal agendas. But as one interlocutor said with a disheartened laugh, at least with politicians you know they are corrupt; the high-profile activists, by contrast, hide behind a discourse of selflessness that obscures their 'real' motivations (which he saw as the pursuit of fame and notoriety). In the view of these critics, the issue of dam building on a culturally and religiously revered river was more akin to the backdrop of a drama than it was the main point around which the drama revolved. The name-calling and instances of critique were often based on memories of misrepresentations, exclusions, and power 'abuses' by notable movement leaders whose past actions continue to impact upon present expressions of skepticism and distrust.
The role of the past in the present speaks to concerns of memory and how it operates in movement processes. The literature on social movements evidences a growing engagement
with memory and what some call 'memory movements', which are efforts to revive collective memory and increase attention to past incidents (and the actions of key individuals) in order to challenge the authority of prevailing understandings. 29 Also important are the insidious ways that memories of campaigns past can destabilise, as well as strengthen, contemporary efforts. 30 Where they are most capable of destabilization is when they are charged with anger over recollections of past injustices done, not just at the hands of policymakers, but by the very movement leaders in whom trust was given. Chakravorty Spivak 39 to demonstrate the possibility that activist intellectuals are unknowingly complicit in the task of further marginalizing the people for whom they claim to speak. 40 It is in the wider spirit of exploring these questions that I study Sunderlal's efforts. While Gandhi's fasting tactics have influenced generations of social movements across the political spectrum, those tactics are not without critique. 47 The founder of an NGO promoting sustainable development and economic prosperity in the region is one such critic.
Sunderlal Bahuguna's Legacy: Memories of the Tehri Dam Movement
As he commented during our interview in July of 2008, Sunderlal's past actions in opposition to the by-then completed Tehri dam may have 'created damage' because his fasts appeared to some to be motivated by a desire to be seen and known more than they were efforts taken in a selfless pursuit of environmental sustainability and religious duty. What is more, this critic charged that Sunderlal's fasts, and the demands that he put forth while enduring those fasts, Beyond the discursive critiques of Sunderlal's fasts, the packaging of his opposition tactics also points to the challenge of channeling Mohandas Gandhi for contemporary protests in India. As Aradhana Sharma and others comment, 49 Gandhi had a particular moral authority to resist British colonial rule (and to promote self dependence and passive resistance, or swadeshi and satyagraha) via his one-man platforms. Those who apply
Gandhi's methods to contemporary activist tactics oftentimes lack that same authority, and many of them refashion his platform while overlooking the ambivalences and controversies that marked Gandhi's protest strategies, as well as other parts of his life. Due to this selective refashioning, writes A. Sharma, the critics of Gandhi-inspired campaigns are more easily able to dismiss activists that have, 'discursively produced Gandhi as an immutable relic with an ossified and... worn-out ideology". 50 They are also able to claim that the contemporary movements are 'undemocratic'-a charge that will be laid out with more explanation in the second profile of activism featured in the following section.
What is important to note here is that the memories of Sunderlal's actions, real or imagined, are influential for the discourses and reactions that people produce. In particular, they serve as evidence for the past subtexts of social discord that shape the cultural politics of protest movements against dams on the upper reaches of the Ganga's flow. This discord, I
argue, continued when three new dams, mentioned earlier, were in the beginning stages of implementation in locations above the completed Tehri dam. When opposition to those three dams arose in the early twenty-first century, it was not Sunderlal Bahuguna but Dr. G.D.
Agarwal that took a prominent public role. after Indian government officials promised to Dr. Agarwal that they would cancel the three contested dams. They also conceded to a demand that the government create an Ecologically
Sensitive Zone (Eco-Zone) in the region where the three contested dams were being built.
Ultimately, the Eco-Zone was officially declared, via a governmental 'notification', in
December of 2012. The notification specifies that a 100-kilometre stretch of the River Bhagirathi flowing from the glacial source at Gaumukh will be protected under a series of guidelines that limit development to mitigate the 'anthropogenic pressure on ecosystems (and) the environment'. 53 The mandates of the Eco-Zone required initial public consultation 'with local people (and) particularly women' but controversy persists over the extent to which this has taken place. 54 As a result, several aspects of the Eco-Zone went under review for potential 'tweaks' demanded by impacted residents, as well as by state government officials, who view the conservation zone as a deterrent to economic opportunity and a burdensome restriction on the state's development. down the mountain for nearly 20 miles. 58 In the same news report that documented the shoe throwing, Mr. Rajendra Singh-often referred to as India's 'waterman' for his prominent work on rainwater harvesting in Rajasthan-claimed that the accosters were backed by the dam construction company and by political interests. 59 While there might be truth to that, the point of leverage was nonetheless the distrust and skepticism of outsiders who meddle in the region's development trajectory, leaving little room for the inclusion of mountain residents.
Also at issue was the concern for mountain-based employment. As Mantri Prasad Naithani of While a number of stalwart dam opponents continued to back Dr. Agarwal and his campaigns, others lamented that such people could not be trusted. One such interlocutor was a woman who I knew to be highly involved in the mountain-based efforts to oppose the dams. When they were finally canceled and Dr. Agarwal was credited with this 'win', she felt that her substantial sacrifice of time and energy was overlooked. As a result, she promised to refrain from all future movement activity-even if the dam cancellations were to one day be reversed. These stances serve as a reminder of the ways that contested activist tactics feed into the cultural politics of hydroelectric development in India, as well as why the negative assessment of activists' personal motivations can lead people who express deep affection and concern for the Ganga to abstain, and even withdraw, from social movement campaigns.
http://www.thehindu.com/todays -paper/tp-national/tp-newdelhi/article3622181.ece, accessed July 12, 2012.
'Name and Fame' and The Cultural Politics of Social Movements Revisited
This text offered an expanded discussion of the varied reactions that citizens demonstrate in response to Himalayan hydropower conflicts. While we should have full sympathy for, and even express outrage at, the ways that hydroelectric projects are being pushed upon 'communities' of people living in the mountains of the Himalaya, we also need to examine the inter-and intra-community tensions that emerge as people make sense of these projects. This includes their appraisals of whether or not these projects can viably be contested, and whether or not those efforts at contestation might be harnessed by a select few for their own personal or political motivations. If and when those appraisals lead people to calculate that it is best to abstain from engaging in protest, then there is also an obligation to examine the ways that this might reflect a more savvy perspective on hydropower conflicts than might otherwise be presumed. Part of this savvy might also be an understanding that the social movements inspired by hydropower conflicts can result in mixed outcomes when the movement participants have divergent motivations and diverse understandings of what is at stake. This points to the hidden subtexts of distrust and skepticism that help explain why Indian citizens do not stand behind high-profile movement leaders more often, as well as why some citizens end up changing their opinions on the value of Himalayan dam building.
Given the concern expressed by those who did not join the dam oppositions, it appears that the inclination to praise the lone upper-caste activist influenced by Gandhian tactics and ideals is one that merits caution. While notable scholarship does show how Mohandas Gandhi's legacy influences contemporary movements in ways that might enable broad-based campaigns, 61 others have indicated that a similar source of inspiration can lead to misrepresentation when the focus is put on a single movement leader. 62 Maintaining an emphasis on the cultural politics operating within movements is, therefore, a way to add nuance to the analyses produced. Such efforts involve looking at 'the articulation of struggles' that are 'simultaneously material and symbolic'. 63 Also at issue in these cultural politics is the questionable use of polarizing discourses, and of attempts to elevate past 'traditions' that have served to keep some people marginalised while others have fared somewhat better. A move to include more attention to the cultural politics of activism may ultimately invite more debate within the social movements that are influenced by a Gandhian activist model that places a lone campaigner-often a man of mature years and high social standing-front and centre. This is significant as the discursive tensions itemised in this text indicate the potential, and the desire, for more democratic and representative means of civic action in the pursuit of equitable resource management.
To underline the point, the critiques of 'fame-seeking' activists are socially important.
These critiques underscore subtexts of social discord that are set within the wider cultural politics of dam building, and of development more broadly. That these critiques exist does not, however, mean that they are always accurate or merited. When writing about the internationally known campaigns against dams on the Narmada River, for instance, Amita
Baviskar reminds us that movements very often have to rely on people with 'celebrity' appeal in order to make the demands of the movement known. 64 Whether that activist is Medha
